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ABSTRACT: Recently, there have been several well-publicized cases in which a
patient in need of a transplant has solicited an organ through the use of
commercial advertising and organized media campaigns. When deceased organs
are directed to an individual as a result of solicitation rather than allocated
through the national system, equity and medical utility are sacrificed. For this
reason, regulation of deceased organ solicitation may be desirable. However,
because solicitation of organs is likely to be considered constitutionally protected
charitable speech, there are significant legal issues to consider. This article
analyzes the legality of four possible policy options to resolve the ethical dilemma
raised by solicitation of deceased organs for transplant.
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I.

Introduction:
The idea of a patient in need of a transplant using the media to secure an organ is

not novel - potential recipients and their advocates have been appealing directly to the
public for specific organ donations as far back as the early 1980’s.1 However, recently
there have been several well-publicized cases in which a potential recipient has solicited
an organ for transplantation through the use of commercial advertising. In August 2004,
Todd Krampitz received a liver donation after advertising through billboards, e-mails, the
internet, and by launching an extensive media campaign.2 A donor family had responded
to these efforts by requesting that their deceased relative’s liver go to Krampitz.3 On
October 20, 2004, the first known organ donation in the U.S. to be arranged through a
commercial website took place when Robert Smitty donated a kidney to Robert Hickey,
whom Smitty had found through MatchingDonors.com.4 Hickey had paid the website a
monthly fee of $250 to advertise for a donor.5

In July of 2005, a highly publicized

media campaign was launched on behalf of Shari Kurzrok, a gravely ill New York public

1

Lainie Friedman Ross, Media Appeals for Directed Altruistic Living Liver Donations: Lessons from
Camilo Sandoval Ewen, 45 Perspectives in Biology and Medicine, 329, 330-331 (2002) (In 1982, Charles
Fiske, a health care executive, pleaded to a ballroom full of doctors to help him find a liver for his infant
daughter, and in 1983, President Reagan made a public appeal on his weekly radio address on behalf
Ashley Bailey, an infant). However, these early cases do not raise the same ethical concerns that exist
today as discussed below, in part because transplants were rare and in part because Congress did not create
the national organ allocation system until 1984. In fact, some would say that the national system was
created as a result of Charles Fiske’s public appeals. See infra text accompanying notes 136-139.
2
Christopher Snowbeck, Publicity Campaigns Seeking Organ Donations Raise Ethics Questions,
Headlines & Deadlines (newsletter of the Pa. Newsp. Assn.), ¶ 2 (August 27, 2004),
http://www.headlinesanddeadlines.org/2004/Aug_27_04/organ_donors.html.
3
Id. at ¶ 3.
4
Arthur Caplan, Organs.com: New Commercially Brokered Organ Transfers Raise Questions, Hastings
Ctr. Rep., Nov.-Dec. 2004, at 8, 8.
5
Caplan, Hastings Ctr. Rep. at 8; but see MatchingDonors.com,
http://www.matchingdonors.com/life/index.cfm?page=services&CFID=79334&CFTOKEN=55949044
(last visited Oct. 11, 2005) (requesting that those who cannot afford membership call for a free membership
code). About 70% of the patients with active profiles are being listed without charge. Robert Steinbrook,
Public Solicitation of Organ Donors, 353 N. Engl. J. Med. 441, 442 (2005).
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relations executive in need of a liver transplant.6 Although Kurzrok ultimately received a
liver transplant through the established national system, this case together with the
Krampitz and Hickey cases heightened public attention about organ solicitation and
raised significant concerns about fairness, utility and the adequacy of the current donation
and transplant system.
All three of these recent cases involved solicitation of organs for transplant into a
specific patient. This is referred to as “directed donation” meaning that the donor (or his
or her family) directs donation of a specific organ to a specific recipient. The Smitty case
is an example of a directed donation in the living donor context. Smitty agreed to donate
one of his kidneys to a specified recipient. The Krampitz and Kurzrok cases are
examples of solicitation for directed donation in the deceased context. The liver donation
being solicited in both cases would come from a deceased donor.
In both the living and deceased donor contexts, directed donations to strangers are
rare. The overwhelming majority of deceased donations are not directed donations.
Instead, donated deceased organs are allocated to anonymous recipients through the
United Network for Organ Sharing (hereafter “UNOS”) system.7 In those rare cases
when a deceased donor’s family directs a donation, it is usually to another family
member or an individual with which the donor or family has a personal bond.8 In
comparison, directed donations are the norm among living donors. Two thirds of living

6

See Daily News, July 27, 2005. See also Deborah L. Shelton, Debate Over Appeals for Organs Heats Up,
St. Louis Post Dispatch, Aug. 23, 2005, at ¶ 7, available at
http://www.fortwayne.com/mld/fortwayne/12453164.htm.
7
The Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network (hereafter “OPTN”), Request for Public Input
Regarding OPTN/UNOS Facilitation of Living Unrelated Kidney Donation: Appendixes, at 6,
http://www.optn.org/PublicComment/pubcommentPropExhibit_21.pdf.
8
Id.
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donations are directed to biological relatives and many of the rest donate to a spouse.9
Still, only a handful of living donations have been publicly reported in which the donor
and recipient met solely for the purpose of donation and had no preexisting relationship
before the recipient’s need for a transplant was first identified.10
Over the past couple of years, however, public donor solicitations resulting in
directed donations to strangers are increasing. MatchingDonors.com alone has facilitated
more than a dozen transplant surgeries between living donors and recipients who were
strangers before the donation. Dozens more are reportedly in the presurgery stage, and
Matchingdonors.com has over 2400 potential donors registered on its website to whom
potential recipients can appeal.11 The intensity of donor solicitations may be increasing
as well, as evidenced by the Kurzrok campaign which allegedly resorted to posting flyers
in hospitals asking families to direct a liver donation to Kurzrok, tracking trauma patients
in emergency rooms, and urging police and emergency medical workers to identify
accident victims who might serve as donors.12 Another interesting development is the
increasingly complex forms that organ solicitations are taking. One website (with over
3,200 members) offers a reciprocal sharing agreement whereby members pledge to direct
their organs in the event of their death first to other members if a suitable match can be
found before donating to the UNOS waiting list.13
Federal law does not prohibit directed donation to an individual and most states
expressly permit it by statute under the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act which governs
9

Id at 2.
Id (UNOS does not collect data on how often this occurs).
11
Rob Stein, Search for Transplant Organs Becomes a Becomes a Web Free-for-All, Washington Post,
September 23, 2005, at A01 ¶ 15, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2005/09/22/AR2005092201901.html; MatchingDonors.com.
12
Id at 6; see also Deborah L. Shelton, Debate Over Appeals for Organs Heats Up, St. Louis Post
Dispatch, Aug. 23, 2005, at ¶ 7, available at http://www.fortwayne.com/mld/fortwayne/12453164.htm.
13
LifeSharers, http://Lifesharers.com (last visited October 11, 2005).
10
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organ donation.14 Federal regulations promulgated by the Department of Health and
Human Services (hereafter “HHS”) expressly permit directed donations.15 Despite the
current legality of directing a donation to a solicitor, many commentators consider this
practice unethical, particularly in the deceased context. This is because directed donation
allows a potential recipient to effectively “jump the line” by soliciting the donation of an
organ that otherwise might have been allocated to a recipient ranked higher on the UNOS
national waiting list.16 The UNOS organ allocation policies are designed to balance
equity for potential recipients with medical utility. Preferences are given according to
certain equitable factors such as time spent on the waiting list and medical urgency.17
The allocation process is designed to accomplish utility by using clinical factors to
distribute organs to recipients who are expected to realize the greatest clinical benefit in
terms of survival.18 Because these allocation policies are applied uniformly, potential
recipients compete equally for organs, receiving preferences only according to these
factors.
Solicitations for deceased donor directed donations bypass this system and may
therefore unfairly give preference to “attractive patients” with greater means of
purchasing advertising or drawing media attention.19 There is, however, a recognized
competing autonomy interest in allowing a donor or donor family to choose who will

14

See 42 U.S.C. § 273-274 (2005); Unif. Anatomical Gift Act § 6(a)(3) (amended 1987); but see Vt. Stat.
Ann. tit. 18 § 5242(a), (d) (2005) (allowing only living donors to make a directed donation).
15
42 C.F.R. § 121.8(h) (2005).
16
Geoff Drushel, Directed organ donation is legal, but is it right? Hepatitis Mag., Jan.–Mar. 2005, at ¶ 68, available at http://www.hepatitismag.com/storydetail.asp?storyid=133 (quoting Arthur Caplan).
17
OPTN, Policies 3.2.1.7-3.2.1.7.9, 3.5.5., http://www.optn.org/policiesAndBylaws/policies.asp (revised
Nov. 19, 2004). Note that whether the potential recipient has been a living organ donor in the past is
considered.
18
Id. at Policy 3.5.3.3.1.
19
Caplan, Hastings Ctr. Rep. at 8.
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receive their anatomical gift by directing the donation.20 Some have argued that donor
solicitations are consistent with utility principles because they may increase total
donations (especially in the context of living donor solicitation), thereby benefiting all
potential recipients by moving successful solicitors off of the national waiting list.21
This article analyzes the legality of four possible policy options to resolve the
ethical dilemma raised by solicitation of organs for trnasplant. Expedient resolution of
this issue is critical given that there are over 90,000 potential recipients listed on the
UNOS waiting list and that 4,856 patients from this list died in 2005 while awaiting an
organ for transplant.22
II. Should public organ donor solicitations be restricted at all?
a. Solicitation of deceased organ donations should be restricted to maintain
equity and medical utility in the organ allocation system.
Directed donation creates a conflict between distributive justice and donor
autonomy.23 The UNOS allocation policies serve principles of distributive justice by
balancing equitable factors such as time spent on the waiting list and medical urgency
with medical utility factors that measure which potential recipients will realize the
greatest clinical benefit from a particular organ.24 This system “levels the playing field”
and allows potential recipients to compete equally, giving preferences only according to
these equitable and medical factors. Solicitations bypass this carefully crafted system
because they encourage selection of potential recipients outside of the established equity

20

Mark D. Fox, When an Organ Donor Names the Recipient, Am. J. Nursing, July 1996, at 66, 66.
Christopher Robertson, Organ Advertising: Desperate Patients Solicit Volunteers, 33 J.L. Med. & Ethics
170, 172 (2005).
22
OPTN, Data Reports, http://www.optn.org/latestData/viewDataReports.asp (last visited Jan. 25, 2006).
23
Fox, Am. J. Nursing at 66.
24
See supra notes 18-19.
21
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and utility factors. However, solicitations for directed donations serve to maximize a
competing interest, donor autonomy.
The autonomy interest in directing an organ donation is often compared to the
autonomy interest in directing material wealth to a specific individual or organization
through one’s will.25 Proponents of donor solicitation believe that this interest outweighs
society’s interest in medical utility. They also believe that solicitations will increase the
total number of organ donations by persuading people who otherwise would not donate to
do so.26 By analogy, if one could not direct monetary donations to the charity of one’s
choice, total charitable donations would arguably decline.27 If a solicitation causes an
organ donation that otherwise would not have happened, patients listed below the
solicitor on the national waiting list would benefit from the solicitor receiving a
transplant because that individual would then move off the list, and patients listed above
the solicitor would be unaffected. Each deceased donation caused by solicitation may
also have a collateral effect on medical utility because a deceased donor usually donates
multiple organs resulting in multiple recipients receiving transplants.28
It is unlikely, however, that the autonomy interest in donating to a solicitor is
what motivated state legislators to pass the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (hereinafter the
“UAGA”) which permits directed donation. The framers of the UAGA did not
contemplate directed donations arranged through solicitations and made in the absence of

25

Cite DAN BROCK in Symposium issue; and Klaus D Teichmann, Directed Tissue Donations, 33
Clinical and Experimental Ophthalmology 112 (2005).
26
Robertson, 33 J.L. Med. & Ethics at 172.
27
Aaron Spital, Must Kidney Donation by Living Strangers be Nondirected?, 72 Transplantation 966
(2001).
28
The national average in 2005 was 2.79 organs transplanted per deceased organ donor. See UNOS
website.
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any preexisting relationship between the donor and the designated recipient.29 Instead,
the directed donation provision in the UAGA was designed to permit families to donate
needed organs to another family member awaiting transplant.30 The autonomy interest at
stake in directing a donation to a stranger is clearly distinguishable from and not nearly as
great as the interest that one has in directing a donation to a family member or close
friend.
Furthermore, a donated organ is not a private gift similar to wealth devised
through a will because transplantation requires greater cooperation from people other
than the donor and intended recipient in order to effectuate the gift.31 In this way, organ
donations can be characterized as social gifts and therefore society may be justified in
limiting a donor’s autonomy in order to promote equity among potential recipients and
ensure that the full utility of the gift is realized.32
The likely outcome of continuing to allow public solicitations of deceased organs
is that deceased organs that might otherwise be made available would be withheld from
those patients ranked higher than the solicitor on the UNOS waiting list.33 It is unknown
whether organ solicitations increase total donations, but donors of deceased organs who
direct donations to solicitors are likely to have donated anyway.34 Thus, solicitors may
move ahead of those who have waited longer, would benefit more, or have more critical
29

E-mail from Blair L. Sadler (a drafter of the UAGA), President and CEO, Children's Hospital and Health
Center, to author, (Dec. 13, 2005, 13:40:00 EST) (on file with author); Drushel, Hepatitis Mag. at ¶ 9-10
(quoting R. Patrick Wood); Sheldon Zink & Stacey L. Wertlieb, Examining the Potential Exploitation of
UNOS Policies, Am. J. Bioethics, July-Aug. 2005, at 6, 8.
30
Id.
31
Eike-Henner W. Kluge, Designated Organ Donation: Private Choice in Social Context, Hastings Ctr.
Rep., Sept-Oct. 1989, at 10, 11.
32
Id. at 11-13. See also Dan Brock, Harvard Symposium (2005).
33
Drushel, Hepatitis Mag. at ¶ 7-8 (quoting Arthur Caplan).
34
See Alvin Powell, HMS examines ethics of Internet organ donation, Harv. U. Gaz., May 19, 2005, at ¶ 22
(quoting Dan Brock), available at http://www.news.harvard.edu/gazette/2005/05.19/09-organ.html, (it is
unknown whether public organ solicitation increases total donations).
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need.35 Case in point, Todd Krampitz did not meet the UNOS listing criteria because he
had metastatic cancer, and died just eight months after receiving transplantation of the
liver he solicited.36
Also, not all policies that might increase total donations are desirable, as is shown
by the fact that most nations ban the purchase and sale of organs.37 Organ solicitations
could undermine public support for the entire procurement and allocation system because
this practice inequitably favors those patients with “attractiveness” and the means to
purchase advertising or draw media attention.38 An appeal for a six-month old infant in
need of a liver donation tugs on potential donors’ heartstrings, while the same appeal
from a middle-aged alcoholic may not, unless the individual happens to be a national
hero.39 Organ solicitations imply that that the solicitor is ethically special compared to
other potential recipients, and invite donors to choose recipients that appear more
deserving rather than those in greater need or who will benefit the most medically.40
Thus, public solicitations of deceased organ donors are likely to reduce both the
equity and efficiency (as measured by medical utility) of the organ allocation system.
Lawmakers, UNOS, and healthcare providers should therefore consider limiting or
prohibiting deceased donor solicitations.

35

Drushel, Hepatitis Mag. at ¶ 7-8 (quoting Arthur Caplan).
Zink, Examining the Potential Exploitation of UNOS Policies, Am. J. Bioethics, at 6; Sheldon Zink &
Stacey L. Wertlieb, Response to Commentators on “Examining the Potential Exploitation of UNOS
Policies”, Am. J. Bioethics, Sept.-Oct. 2005, at W15, available at
http://www.bioethics.net/journal/j_articles.php?aid=842.
37
Andrew H. Barnett, Roger D. Blair, & David L Kaserman, Improving Organ Donation: Compensation
versus Markets, in The Ethics of Organ Transplants: The Current Debate, 209, 209-212, (Arthur L. Caplan
& Daniel H. Coelho eds., Prometheus Books 1998) (Arguing that donor compensation would increase total
donations); Ross, 45 Perspectives in Biology and Medicine at 333.
38
Caplan, Hastings Ctr. Rep. at 8.
39
Ross, 45 Perspectives in Biology and Medicine at 333.
40
Kluge, Hastings Ctr. Rep. at 12.
36

11
b. Solicitation of living donations should be permitted because they increase
total donations without sacrificing equity and medical utility.
There is currently no national system for allocating organs from living donors and
no organized waiting list for potential recipients as there is for deceased organs.41 Thus,
the effect of a solicited donation from a living donor is significantly different. A living
donation to a solicitor is far less likely to deprive any potential recipient of an organ that
he or she would otherwise have received.42 Instead, a directed living donation takes the
solicitor off the waiting list for deceased organs or eliminates the solicitor’s need to go on
the list to begin with, thereby benefiting the patients that are or would have been listed
below the solicitor. Additionally, the data supports a conclusion that solicitation will
likely increase living donations because living donors prefer to donate to a person they
know.43 “Please donate your kidney” will never elicit the same response as “Please
donate your kidney to Robert Hickey.”44 For example, a media appeal in Canada on
behalf of a specific recipient resulted in 50 calls to transplant centers from people wishing
to be living donors, when transplant centers normally only receive a few such calls a
month.45
Living donors do sometimes donate without specifying a recipient. In those
instances, the donated organ goes through a local matching system to a patient on the
UNOS waiting list.46 Accordingly, it is possible that a solicitor may receive an organ
from living donors that would have been allocated to a different recipient on the UNOS
list. However, anonymous, non-directed donations to the waiting list from living donors,
41

Drushel, Hepatitis Mag. at ¶ 6 (quoting Arthur Caplan).
Id.
43
Supra note 9 at 2; see also Jacob M. Appel, Organ Solicitation On the Internet: Every Man for Himself?
Hastings Ctr. Rep., May-June 2005, at 14, 15.
44
See id.
45
Ross, 45 Perspectives in Biology and Medicine at 332.
46
See e.g. New England Kidney Exchange at www.nepke.org; OPTN, supra note 8, at 4.
42
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called “Good Samaritan donations,” are rare. Only 87 transplants of organs from living
altruistic donors were performed nationwide in 2004.47
Good Samaritan donations are rare because of an important distinction between
donation in the living and deceased contexts; the living donor’s significant personal
sacrifice. Unlike a deceased donor or a deceased donor’s family, a living donor must
bear the personal health risks of invasive surgery and living without the donated organ.
In comparison to solicited deceased donors who likely would have donated anyway, most
solicited living donors would likely not have donated unless they could direct their
donation to the solicitor. Thus, permitting solicitation of living donors is more likely to
increase total organ donations that otherwise would not have occurred. This is a benefit
to the entire organ donation and transplantation system.
The serious sacrifice made by living donors is also significant to evaluating the
donor’s autonomy interest in directing a donation. A living donor makes a far greater
personal sacrifice than a deceased donor and, unlike the deceased donor, may also
experience some benefit through forming a personal bond with the recipient after
transplantation. As a result, one may argue that society should give the donor’s
autonomy interest more weight in the living context than in the deceased context.
It remains true that “attractive patients” and those with greater means of
purchasing advertising or drawing media attention will inevitably be more successful at
soliciting living donors.48 Also, there is a possible added inequity in the living context
because federal law permits payment of reasonable compensation for the living donor’s

47
48

Id. at 2.
Caplan, Hastings Ctr. Rep. at 8.
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travel expenses and lost wages associated with living donation.49 A solicitor who has the
financial means to reimburse a living donor for these costs may be more likely to
successfully solicit a living donor. In one recent case, these expenses included a stay in a
luxury hotel and totaled $5,000, a sum that not all solicitors can afford.50
The existence of possible inequities may not justify prohibiting living donations
directed to solicitors as they do in the case of deceased donation. The over-riding
consideration is that solicitations of living donors are more likely to increase total organ
donations. Increasing the total number of living organ donations is more likely to benefit
other potential recipients rather than to deprive them of organs that they otherwise might
have received. There is no system for living donation carefully crafted to maximize
equity and efficiency that donor solicitations would disrupt. Also, the living donor’s
autonomy interest in directing a donation deserves more significant weight given the
personal sacrifice involved. Lawmakers, UNOS, and healthcare providers should,
therefore, continue to permit solicitations of living donors and directed donations made
by living donors to solicitors.
III.

Legal Analysis of Organ Donor Solicitations as Constitutionally Protected
Speech
Regardless of how deceased organ donor solicitations are classified, they are

protected free speech under the first amendment of the United States Constitution. An
outright government ban on deceased organ donor solicitations would, therefore, clearly
be unconstitutional. Certain reasonable regulations may, however, pass constitutional
scrutiny depending on the level of legal scrutiny that applies.
49

42 U.S.C. § 274e(c)(2). Although the deceased donor does not incur travel costs or lost wages, the costs
associated with a deceased donation are never born by the donor family.
50
Appel, Hastings Ctr. Rep. at 14.
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a. Protection for Charitable Solicitations: Strict Scrutiny Review
It is settled law that charitable organizations that solicit gifts or financial
contributions are protected under the first amendment.51 Charitable appeals are protected
free speech because they involve a variety of speech interests such as communication of
information, the dissemination and propagation of views and ideas, and the advocacy of
causes.52 Additionally, charitable solicitation is characteristically intertwined with
informative speech promoting economic, political, and social issues.53 Although the
Supreme Court has not specifically considered whether an individual solicitor seeking
private charity is protected under the first amendment, circuit courts have found no
meaningful distinction between soliciting for oneself versus soliciting for a charitable
organization because both forms of speech contain social messages.54
The Supreme Court applies the most exacting level of scrutiny, strict scrutiny, to
any regulation that restricts protected speech on the basis of its content.55 To meet strict
scrutiny, any regulation must be necessary to serve a compelling state interest and must
be narrowly drawn to achieve that end.56
In contrast, commercial speech receives only intermediate protection under the
first amendment. The courts have not, however, treated charitable solicitation as
commercial speech. Speech is considered commercial when it is primarily related to the
economic interests of the speaker, or is primarily concerned with providing information

51

Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env., 444 U.S. 620, 632 (1980).
Id.
53
Id.
54
Gresham v. Peterson, 225 F.3d 899, 903-904 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that even panhandling is protected
free speech because it may contain social messages on the issue of poverty).
55
Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641-642 (1994).
56
Ark. Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 231 (U.S., 1987).
52
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about the costs of goods and services or proposing a commercial transaction.57 For
example, a contraceptive manufacturer that mails advertisements for its products engages
in commercial speech despite the fact that the communication contains information on
issues such as venereal disease and family planning.58 Here it can be inferred that the
manufacturer’s primary purpose was not disseminating information on venereal disease
and family planning. This is because the communication took the form of an
advertisement for a specific product and was motivated by an economic interest,
(soliciting a commercial transaction).59
Applying this test to charitable solicitation, the Supreme Court has found that
charitable solicitations are not commercial speech.60 This is because they are concerned
with more than just the economic interests of the speaker, providing cost information
about goods and services, or proposing a commercial transaction. They are intertwined
with informative speech advancing economic, political, and social issues.61
Courts distinguish between commercial and noncommercial speech on the basis
of the content of the message itself, not the mode in which the speaker transmits it.
Speech that is otherwise considered noncommercial does not become commercial merely
because its speaker delivers the message in a paid advertisement.62 For example, in
considering whether a newspaper committed libel for running a paid advertisement, the
Supreme Court held that whether the newspaper was paid for the advertisement was
57

Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 632; C. Hudson Gas and Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Commn., 447 U.S. 557, 561
(1980);
Va. Bd. of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976).
58
Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 67-68 (1983).
59
Id.
60
Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 632.
61
Id.
62
Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 514-515 (U.S., 1981) (the court treated messages
conveyed on billboards as noncommercial on the basis of their content even though they were paid
advertisements).
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irrelevant in determining whether it had engaged in commercial speech.63 “To hold
otherwise would convert virtually all books, newspapers, and magazines into commercial
speech [merely because the printer was paid], and call into question the traditional
protections afforded these types of publications.”64 In fact, the Supreme Court has
clarified that a speaker may even hire canvassers to promote a noncommercial message
without engaging in commercial speech.65 The first amendment protects the right not
only to advocate a cause, but also to select the most effective means for doing so.66
b. Intrusive Charitable Solicitations: Reasonableness Standard
More intrusive charitable solicitations, such as those requesting funds, are subject
to reasonable regulation.67 For example, courts have reasoned that solicitations of funds
on a public street are intrusive because the solicitor and others watch and may exert
social pressure on the person solicited, who may then have to stop on a busy street and
open his wallet.68 This type of solicitation is considered more intrusive than solicitations
that merely involve the distribution of literature.69 Of course, even the most benign
solicitations can be considered intrusive and therefore subject to reasonable regulation in
certain circumstances; the first amendment would not require a city to permit a man with
a communicable disease to distribute leaflets on public streets.70

63

New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964).
U.S. Olympic Comm. v. Am. Media, Inc., 156 F. Supp. 2d 1200, 1208 (D. Colo. 2001).
65
Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 426 (1988) (the court found that paid petition circulators engaged in
noncommercial speech because the content of the speech itself was noncommercial).
66
Id at 424.
67
Schaumburg , 444 U.S. at 632.
68
U.S. v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 734 (1990).
69
Id.
70
Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943).
64
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The reasonableness standard is considerably easier for the government to meet
than the strict scrutiny standard. To be reasonable, a regulation must appropriately
balance legitimate government interests against the right to free speech and cannot be
overly broad.71 For example, the Supreme Court has held that the Government’s
legitimate interest in preventing fraudulent solicitations, (such as burglars posing as
canvassers), justifies the reasonable requirement that canvassers register with a town
prior to canvassing and establish their identity and affiliation with the organization they
represent.72
c. Organ Donor Solicitations are Charitable Solicitations
Nonprofit organizations such as MatchingDonors.com that solicit donors are
likely to be considered protected under the first amendment as charitable solicitors
because their services promote the social issue of organ donation by encouraging organ
donations in the broader context.73 An individual organ solicitor is also likely to be
protected under the first Amendment because the solicitation promotes the social issue of
organ donation generally. For example, the appeals on behalf of Todd Krampitz always
contained broader requests for people to donate organs, and after he received a directed
donation, the family put up a new billboard that said “Thank You” and encouraged more
people to donate organs for transplant.74
Deceased organ donor solicitations are likely to be considered noncommercial
speech because they are not primarily concerned with providing information about the
71

Watchtower Bible and Tract Socy. v. Village of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 165 (2002).
Id. at 162-163.
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costs of goods and services or proposing a commercial transaction, nor are they primarily
related to the economic interests of the organ solicitor. They are primarily concerned
with obtaining a life saving gift from potential deceased donors and promoting the social
message that more people should donate life-saving organs. Although made in the form
of an advertisement, these solicitations make no reference to a specific product or to the
costs of goods or services, and, at least on their face, do not propose a commercial
transaction.
A for-profit corporation that posts paid solicitations for organ donors may not be
considered to have engaged in commercial speech either because the content of the
solicitor’s message itself is not commercial. Such a corporation would be treated and
protected like a newspaper that is paid to print constitutionally protected
advertisements.75 Even if a corporation were actively soliciting organ donors on behalf
of its clients, it would still not be engaging in commercial speech because the clients’
noncommercial messages are not made commercial merely because they took the form of
a paid advertisement or because the clients paid others to present them.76 Here, the
corporation would be treated and protected like canvassers paid to promote a speaker’s
political message.77 Again, the first amendment protects not only the solicitor’s right to
communicate his message, but also the right to select the most effective means for doing
so.78
d. Reasonable Regulation of Intrusive Deceased Organ Donor Solicitations
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Whether a court subjects regulations of deceased organ donor solicitations to the
strict scrutiny standard or the reasonableness standard of review will depend on how
intrusive the particular solicitations involved are. If a particular solicitation is found not
to be intrusive, any regulation of it would have to satisfy strict scrutiny by being
necessary to serve a compelling state interest and narrowly drawn to achieve that end.
Examples of less intrusive solicitations may include informative media reports, the
general posting of an organ donation request in a public place or the internet, and the
LifeSharers website, which invites members to agree to direct their organs in the event of
their death first to other members if a suitable match can be found (a reciprocal sharing
agreement).79 In these cases, the solicitor does not physically approach anyone and the
person solicited is free to ignore the solicitation with no consequence. Then again, in the
case of posting requests in a public place or the internet, it is possible to argue that the
intrusive part of the solicitation occurs later, when the person solicited contacts the
solicitor to discuss the details.
If a particular type of solicitation is not considered intrusive, an outright
government ban is unlikely to satisfy the strict scrutiny standard of review. The
government might argue that banning deceased organ donation solicitations is necessary
to achieve its primary objects of preserving equity and medical utility through the current
system. However, there is no empirical data to show that deceased organ solicitations
will harm the national organ allocation system or to refute the counter-argument that
79
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solicitations may increase total donations.80 Thus, it would be difficult for the
government to show that an outright ban on deceased organ donation solicitations is
“necessary” to accomplish those goals. Other less restrictive measures may be possible
as discussed below.
Deceased organ solicitations that can fairly be characterized as intrusive could be
subject to reasonable regulation. Because society values donated organs as a scare
resource and because of the personal and physical nature of an organ donation, deceased
organ solicitations are likely to be considered at least as intrusive as solicitations for
funds.81 Certainly deceased organ solicitations involving direct contact with emergency
workers or hospital staff or where there is an in-person solicitation of a potential donor or
donor family are likely to be considered intrusive.82 Moreover, the government has
several legitimate interests in regulating deceased organ solicitations. First, it has an
interest in promoting equitable and efficient allocation of deceased organs. Second, it has
an interest in preventing solicitors from putting undue emotional pressure on potential
donors or donor families or misrepresenting their condition.83 Finally, it has an interest in
preventing solicitors from inappropriately offering to purchase organs from donors,
which is a federal offense.84
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To be reasonable, any restriction must balance the right to free speech with these
legitimate interests. Reasonable restrictions may include requirements that deceased
organ solicitors establish their identity, present only truthful information regarding the
potential recipient’s condition and use non-coercive language. Restrictions on the time,
place, and manner of deceased organ solicitation, (such as a prohibition on solicitations in
a hospital) are also reasonable. It may even be reasonable to require deceased organ
solicitations to carry a disclaimer that UNOS does not support deceased directed
donations to solicitors, and the URL for a website containing information on the issue to
dissuade such donations. All of these restrictions on deceased organ solicitation are
likely to be considered reasonable if such a standard applies. However, an outright ban
on deceased donor solicitation is unlikely to withstand a constitutional challenge that it is
an unreasonable restriction because it would not adequately balance government interests
with the right to free speech. Thus, while Congress and states cannot outright ban
deceased organ donor solicitations, they may be able to pass reasonable regulations on
intrusive deceased organ solicitations.
e. Organ Donor Solicitations are Protected Even if Characterized as
Commercial Speech.
Although it receives less protection than other forms of speech, commercial
speech is still protected under the first amendment.85 The government may only restrict
commercial speech if the speech presents deceptive information or if the restriction
directly advances a substantial government interest and is not excessive.86 To assert that
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a restriction advances a substantial interest, the government must show that there are real
harms that the restriction will alleviate to a material degree.87
For commercial solicitations, the government can meet its burden in showing that
the restriction will alleviate real harms if it is reasonable to presume that more often than
not, the solicitations are injurious to the person solicited.88 For example, the Supreme
Court has held that a state may prohibit lawyers from soliciting clients in-person because
lawyers are trained in the art of persuasion and are capable of convincing an injured and
distressed lay person into placing trust in the lawyer regardless of the lawyer’s
qualifications or the individual’s actual need for legal representation.89 Also, the Court
stated that the lawyer’s solicitation itself may cause distress to the layperson at the time
of injury.90 Thus, the Supreme Court found that it is reasonable to presume that more
often than not, in-person solicitations by lawyers are injurious to the person solicited.91
In contrast, the Supreme Court struck down a state ban on personal solicitations by
certified public accounts because it is not reasonable to presume that such solicitations
are injurious to the person solicited more often than not.92 The court reasoned that
accountants are not trained in the art of persuasion and the clients they solicit are
sophisticated business executives who can choose when and where to meet them.93
In the case of commercial deceased organ donor solicitation, it is unlikely that the
government could show that a flat ban advances a substantial interest and is not
excessive. The government has legitimate interests such as preventing solicitors from
87
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coercing donors and donor families, preventing them from presenting deceptive
information, and preventing them from offering payment for organs (a federal offense).94
It may be difficult, however, for the government to show that the solicitations are
injurious to the person solicited more often than not. In the deceased context, the primary
harm of organ solicitations for directed donations is to other potential transplant
recipients. This possible harm to other potential recipients results from donors exercising
their statutory right to direct organ donations, and not directly from the solicitation itself.
There may also be some emotional harm to the donor’s family if the solicitation is
insensitive, offensive, or intrusive. A deceased organ solicitation made by one skilled in
the art of persuasion at a hospital or at the donor’s time of death may be injurious in the
same way a lawyer’s solicitation of an injured and distressed client is. Still, an outright
ban would likely be considered excessive because in most other contexts, these
solicitations will not be injurious to donors or donor families more often than not.95
The government has a legitimate interest in preventing the harm to other potential
recipients that would occur if deceased organ donor solicitations prevent the equitable
and efficient allocation of organs. Nevertheless, the government is unlikely to meet its
burden of showing that a ban would alleviate a real harm to the national allocation system
because there is no direct evidence to refute the counterargument that solicitations will
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increase total donations.96 Thus, at least at the present time, it would be difficult for the
government to show that a ban would advance the substantial interest of preventing harm
to the national organ allocation system.
Therefore, even if deceased organ solicitations could be classified as commercial
speech, it is unlikely that an outright ban would withstand a constitutional challenge.
Nevertheless, other restrictions would be constitutional if they restrict deceptive
solicitations or advance a substantial interest and are not excessive. Potential regulations
include those discussed above in the previous section as reasonable regulations of more
intrusive charitable solicitations.
IV.

Policy Options to Restrict Deceased Organ Donor Solicitations
a. Banning Deceased Organ Donor Solicitations is Not Legally Viable.
The government may ban speech that incites illegal activity if the speech is

directed toward producing imminent illegal action and is likely to succeed.97 To show
that speech is directed toward producing illegal action, the government must show that
the speaker had intent to produce illegal action.98 A ban on speech that incites illegal
activity must only apply to speech that satisfies this intent requirement.99 Otherwise,
courts will consider the ban overly broad because it will apply to constitutionally
protected speech as well and will cause individuals to refrain from protected speech for
fear of criminal sanctions.100 Thus, a ban on speech that incites illegal activity must be
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narrowly drawn to apply only to cases where the speaker intended to produce illegal
activity.101
Although directed organ donation is legal, federal law and most state laws
prohibit the purchase and sale of human organs.102 Even where state law does not
prohibit selling organs, federal law is controlling.103 After Robert Hickey’s transplant,
suspicions ran high that he paid Robert Smitty for his kidney. This was based on the fact
that Smitty was arrested days after the transplant for failure to pay child support, and
anonymous benefactors posted the funds necessary for his release.104 Additionally,
MatchingDonors.com admits that its clients have been barraged with requests for cash
from potential donors.105
Nevertheless, these events are not enough to justify a ban on organ donor
solicitations as incitement of illegal activity. Absent a showing that a specific organ
solicitor intended to pay for an organ, a solicitation cannot be characterized as incitement
of illegal activity. An outright ban on organ solicitation would be considered overly
broad because it would apply to many cases in which a solicitor did not intend to pay for
an organ, and would thus infringe constitutionally protected speech. A ban may only
survive a constitutional challenge if it is narrowly drawn to apply only where a solicitor
intends to offer payment. Thus, the government cannot outright ban organ solicitations
as incitement of illegal activity.
101
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b. Restricting Transplants for Solicitors of Deceased Organs.
After Robert Hickey received his transplant, St. Luke’s, the University of
Colorado hospital that performed the transplant, issued a moratorium on transplants for
internet-matched living donation pairs.106 Since then, hundreds of other hospitals
nationwide have followed suit.107

If legally permissible, these policies could effectively

prevent directed donations made to solicitors in both the living and deceased contexts.
Such policies raise the issue of common law liability for patient abandonment, but
transplant centers can take steps to protect themselves.
Transplant centers and surgeons owe a common law duty to their patients to
continue providing care until their services are no longer needed, or are dispensed with
by the patient.108 Once a physician/patient relationship is initiated, a healthcare provider
is liable for abandonment if it withdraws from providing care without giving reasonable
notice so that the patient may secure other medical care, and if an injury results.109
Patient abandonment gives rise to liability for both negligence and breach of contract
claims.110
Patient abandonment liability exists for breach of contract because the provider
has unilaterally terminated the physician/patient relationship.111 And, patient
abandonment liability for negligence exists because the provider has breached its duty by
choosing not to provide the patient with professional services at the pertinent standard of
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care.112 This differs from ordinary negligence in that the provider consciously chooses
not to provide appropriate services, rather than fails to meet the standard due to
carelessness.113 An abandonment claim fails if the provider gives reasonable notice of
withdrawing services or if the physician/patient relationship is terminated by mutual
consent.114
Additionally, an abandonment claim should fail if the provider has not assumed a
duty of care for the patient. Thus, it may be possible to forestall an abandonment claim
by limiting the scope of the physician/patient relationship before the provider assumes a
duty of care for the patient. The physician/patient relationship is essentially a contractual
one, and providers have the right to contractually limit the scope of services that they will
provide patients with when they assume care.115 Although such a contract might appear
to be an adhesion contract at first blush (because the provider presents it on a “take it or
leave it basis” and the patient lacks bargaining power), courts have distinguished between
contracts limiting the scope of services to be provided and contracts limiting the patient’s
right to sue for negligence, and have only voided the latter as adhesion contracts contrary
to public policy.116
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There are no provisions in the National Organ Transplant Act (hereafter
“NOTA”) or state anatomical gift statutes that abrogate a provider’s common law duty
not to abandon.117 Nevertheless, it is likely that transplant surgeons could establish a
policy of refusing to perform a transplant for a solicitor of deceased organ donors without
exposing itself to abandonment liability. A provider can discharge a patient from care
and give reasonable notice for the patient to obtain care at another transplant center if it
discovers that a patient is soliciting for a deceased organ donation.
However, if the transplant surgeon does not discover that the patient has solicited
until a directed donation of an organ from a deceased donor is made, it is unlikely to be
able to give reasonable notice because deceased organs must be transplanted within
hours.118 Still, transplant surgeons may be able to protect themselves from liability even
in this situation by informing potential recipients of their policies against facilitating
transplants of deceased organs that have been directed through solicitation. Appropriate
notice of such a policy must occur before a physician/patient relationship is established
and should be acknowledged and consented to by prospective patients.119 This could be
accomplished by having prospective patients agree up front that the transplant surgeon is
not accepting a duty to transplant deceased organs that are directed as a result of
solicitation and consent to termination of care if the center discovers that the patient has
solicited. Such a policy is consistent with a provider’s right to contractually limit the
scope of care provided. Faced with a breach of contract claim or a negligence claim, a
117
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provider should be able to argue that it never accepted a contract or assumed a duty to
treat the patient under these circumstances, and that there is mutual consent to
termination because the patient has agreed in advance to termination of care in the event
that the patient solicited deceased organ donations.
There is precedent establishing that agreements limiting the scope of care to be
provided are not adhesion contracts.120 Also, such policies are not likely to increase
organ wastage, as Organ Procurement Organizations (hereafter “OPOs”) might
effectively dissuade directed donations to solicitors by informing donor families of
transplant surgeons’ policies against transplanting solicited deceased organs.121

c. Refusing to Facilitate Certain Directed Donations.
Organ Procurement Organizations (OPOs) are defined by federal regulation as
nonprofit entities that coordinate the consent, recovery, and allocation of organs from
deceased donors through the UNOS system.122 All parties involved in organ
transplantations from deceased donors depend on OPO personnel to facilitate donation.
Since the federal government designates only one OPO per geographical region with no
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overlap, an OPO policy of refusing to facilitate deceased directed donations made to
solicitors would effectively prevent deceased donors and their families within that OPO’s
region from making such donations.123
In order to avoid any appearance that the federal government is somehow
indirectly prohibiting protected free speech (OPOs are not government entities but do
receive Medicare funding), such a policy could be written as a refusal to accept and
procure donations directed to any recipient with whom the deceased donor has not had a
preexisting relationship with before the recipient’s need for a transplant was first
identified.124 Such a policy should reduce any potential OPO liability because there is no
established duty in statute or common law for an OPO to facilitate any particular directed
donation.125
Laws that permit directed donation allow a donor or donor family to designate an
individual recipient for donation; they do not require the donee (often the OPO) to accept
the donation and facilitate its allocation for transplant.126 In fact, state anatomical gift
statutes expressly preserve a donee’s right to reject an anatomical gift.127 Thus, these
laws do not grant either the donor or the designated recipient the right to conscript an
OPO to aid him in removing the organ.128
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It is true that federal regulations require OPOs to conduct systematic efforts to
acquire all usable organs from potential deceased donors and avoid organ wastage.129
However, federal regulations also require OPOs to have a system for equitably allocating
donated organs among transplant patients.130 Thus, an OPO may argue that by refusing
to facilitate deceased donations directed in the absence of a preexisting relationship it is
fulfilling its other statutory duty to equitably allocate donated organs. It may also argue
that such a policy fulfills its duty to acquire all usable organs more broadly by protecting
the integrity of the entire allocation system.
Under common law, the conclusion is the same. An OPO owes no legal duty to
designated recipients of directed donations because it never initiates or enters into a
physician/patient relationship with these potential recipients and so never assumes a duty
of care toward them.131 In spite of this, some have argued that an OPO assumes a duty to
procure deceased organs for potential recipients by rendering services that it should
recognize as necessary for the protection of potential recipients, (a gratuitous
undertaking).132
An entity only assumes a duty of care through a gratuitous undertaking if its
failure to exercise care increases the risk of the harm or if the harm suffered is because of
the other’s reliance.133 An OPO that refuses to facilitate a directed donation does not
increase the designated recipient’s risk beyond the risk that would exist if the OPO had
not rendered any services at all. Also, the harm suffered by the designated recipient
129
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cannot be caused by reliance on the OPO if the OPO policy is made public. Moreover,
even if a common law duty could be found, it is possible to argue that federal regulations
and state anatomical gift statutes abrogate this duty by preserving a donee’s right to reject
any anatomical gift and by requiring OPOs to equitably allocate organs.134 Thus, there is
no legal duty for OPOs to facilitate directed donations made in the absence of a
preexisting relationship between the donor and the designated recipient, and OPOs can
refuse to facilitate such donations without incurring liability.

d. OPTN Policy Prohibiting Facilitation of Certain Directed Donations.
In 1984, Congress authorized the Organ Procurement and Transplantation
Network (hereafter “OPTN”) to set national organ allocation policies through NOTA.135
This broad grant of authority is supported by Congress’s spending power and its power to
regulate interstate commerce.136 NOTA requires the Secretary of HHS to contract with a
private nonprofit organization to maintain the OPTN, but leaves the authority to set
allocation policies with the OPTN.137 UNOS has held this contract and maintained the
OPTN since 1986.138
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Hospitals that perform organ transplants must maintain membership with the OPTN
in order to receive access to organs from the OPTN/UNOS system and receive federal
Medicare funding.139 Thus, the OPTN can enforce its policies by denying membership
and access to organs from its system to transplant centers that do not comply. The
Secretary of HHS can support OPTN policies by cutting federal Medicare funding for
transplant centers and OPOs that do not comply.140 Because the OPTN has broad
Congressional authority to set national allocation policies and the power to set policies
that transplant centers in all 50 states must abide by, an OPTN policy against organ donor
solicitations may be the most politically expedient solution to the issue. So far, the
OPTN Board of Directors has adopted a statement opposing public solicitations of
deceased organs and has established a committee to examine the issue in both the living
and deceased contexts, but has not amended its allocation policies.141
It would appear that the OPTN has the authority to adopt a policy prohibiting its
members from allowing patients to solicit organs. There are two potential ways to draft
such a policy, both of which could apply to deceased donations. The first option would
prohibit members from facilitating transplants for any recipient that has solicited,
regardless of whether or not the recipient obtained a directed donation. The second
possibility would be to only prohibit members from transplanting or procuring organs
that were directed to the recipient as a result of a solicitation. To support either policy,
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the OPTN and HHS would deny access to organs from the OPTN/UNOS system and
Medicare funding to members that are in violation. However, neither policy is likely to
pass a constitutional challenge because both policies infringe protected free speech.
i. The Unconstitutional Condition Doctrine
Under the unconstitutional condition doctrine, the government may not withhold
valuable government benefits that would otherwise be available because an individual
has exercised a constitutionally protected right, such as the right to free speech.142 The
government may not condition a benefit on the abstention from a protected right even if
the individual has no fundamental right to receive the benefit.143 For example, a state
university cannot deny a non-tenured professor continued employment because he
exercised his constitutional right to publicly criticize the university, even though the
professor has no fundamental right to employment at the University.144 The government
may not use conditional benefits to indirectly restrict a constitutional right that it could
not directly restrict.145
Of course, the government can selectively choose which programs to subsidize, and
does not infringe a constitutional right merely by choosing not to subsidize the exercise
of that right.146

For example, in Rust v. Sullivan, the Supreme Court upheld a federal

regulation that prohibited recipients of federal funds for family-planning services from
providing counseling concerning the use of abortion as a method for family-planning.147
The Supreme Court found that the government was not conditioning funds that would
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otherwise be available on the funding recipients forgoing a constitutional right; it was
merely choosing to subsidize certain forms of counseling at the exclusion of others.148
However, government funding decisions based on abstentions from protected
speech are only upheld in situations where the government is itself the speaker or has
used private speakers to transmit information pertaining to its own program.149 When the
government distributes public funds to private entities to convey a governmental
message, it may take appropriate steps to ensure that the message is not distorted by the
grantee.150 This was the case in Rust, because the Court characterized the recipients of
the funding as entities chosen by the government to transmit the government’s chosen
family-planning message.151
ii. Directing OPTN Members to Prohibit Solicitation Creates an
Unconstitutional Condition
In the case of an OPTN policy against its members facilitating transplants for any
recipient that has solicited, the government would be acting through the OPTN to
condition valuable government benefits that would otherwise be available to potential
recipients, on the condition that potential recipients forgo their constitutional rights.
Potential recipients would have to abstain from exercising their first amendment right to
solicit organ donations in order to receive access to organs from the OPTN/UNOS system
and transplantations from Medicare funded centers.152 If constitutional, such a policy
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would allow the government to indirectly do what it cannot do directly: prohibit speech
that solicits organ donations.153
Although transplant centers with membership in the OPTN may be characterized as
private entities that the OPTN uses to transmit information about its own programs, it is
not these centers that the OPTN would be forcing to forgo constitutional rights. Instead,
the OPTN would prohibit potential recipients from exercising their constitutional rights,
and these patients are neither government speakers nor entities used by the government to
transmit information. Thus, an OPTN policy prohibiting its members from facilitating
transplants for recipients that have solicited is unlikely to withstand constitutional
challenge.
Similarly, in the case of the more narrow policy of prohibiting members from
transplanting or procuring solicited organs, the government would be acting through the
OPTN to condition valuable government benefits on the condition that potential
recipients forgo their constitutional right to speech. The OPTN would be denying
recipients the ability to receive transplantation of directed organs at Medicare funded
centers that would otherwise be available, on the basis of whether or not the recipient has
solicited.
On the other hand, recipients would not be directly penalized for exercising their
right to solicit because they would still have access to non-solicited organs from the
OPTN/UNOS system and transplantations of these organs at Medicare funded centers,
regardless of whether they have ever solicited. Additionally, it is possible to argue that
the speech itself is not being directly or indirectly regulated, because patients are not
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coerced to forgo their constitutional right to solicit. Instead, they are denied a benefit that
they may not have even if they remained silent.
However, the OPTN would still be conditioning benefits that would otherwise be
available on whether the designated recipient has exercised his right of free speech. For
each directed donation, members would have to determine whether the donation was
solicited. If the named recipient did not solicit the donation, the transplantation could go
forward. If the recipient did solicit, transplantation of the directed donation could not
proceed. Thus, the OPTN would be denying the recipient a government benefit that
would otherwise be available; transplantation at a Medicare funded hospital involving a
directed organ, because that recipient had exercised a constitutional right.
Furthermore, this less restrictive policy cannot be defended on the grounds that
transplant centers and OPOs are private entities used by the OPTN to transmit
information concerning its own programs. This policy would affect the constitutional
rights of potential recipients rather than OPTN members, and potential recipients are
neither government speakers nor entities used by the government to transmit information.
Thus, an OPTN policy prohibiting its members from transplanting solicited organs is also
unlikely to withstand constitutional challenge.
iii. The OPTN may be able to prohibit its members from facilitating
donations directed toward solicitors on the basis of the
relationship between the donor and the designated recipient.
In contrast to an OPTN policy that focuses on the actions of the designated
recipient, an OPTN policy against donors directing donations to solicitors, if carefully
drafted, may withstand a constitutional challenge. This policy would state that member
transplant centers and OPOs cannot allow deceased donors, or families of deceased
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donors to make directed donations to individuals with whom the deceased donor has had
no preexisting relationship with before the recipient’s need for a transplant was first
identified. This would prevent the allocation of organs to individuals whom the donor or
donor family came into contact with solely for the purpose of facilitating an organ
donation, without infringing the right to make directed donations to family members,
friends, and others with whom the donor had previous emotional ties to.154 The OPTN
may be able to condition transplant center and OPO membership on compliance with
such a policy. There is certainly a potential enforcement issue given that it may be
difficult to define or discern a “preexisting relationship.” But, it is clear that in cases of
pure solicitation there is no “preexisting relationship.” Thus, such a policy may
effectively prevent directed donations that result from deceased organ solicitation.
This policy would likely not violate the unconstitutional condition doctrine because
the OPTN would not be conditioning benefits on a recipient’s exercise of the right to free
speech.155 Regardless of whether the patient solicited, he would still have access to
organs from the OPTN/UNOS system and transplantations from Medicare funded centers
for any organs received from the OPTN or from a directed donation made in the presence
a preexisting relationship. The OPTN would not be directly or indirectly regulating
protected speech because recipients who solicit would not lose any benefits that they
otherwise would have otherwise had based on the solicitation.
Similarly, OPOs and transplant centers would make the distinction on the basis of
whether there was a preexisting relationship, and not on whether the recipient exercised
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the constitutional right to free speech. Such a policy would not limit a recipient’s right to
engage in free speech. Instead, it would limit a donor’s ability to direct a donation. A
donor’s right to direct a donation to a stranger can hardly be considered a valuable
government benefit in the same way that access to organs from the OPTN system and
access to federally funded transplant centers can be. For these reasons, such a policy
would likely pass an unconstitutional condition challenge.
iv. An OPTN policy preventing its members from facilitating
deceased directed donations made in the absence of a preexisting
relationship would not fatally conflict with state or federal law.
Federal regulations and many state anatomical gift statutes expressly authorize
directed organ donations from both living and deceased donors.156 For example, the
UAGA states that an anatomical gift may be made to “a designated individual for
transplantation or therapy needed by that individual.”157 Nonetheless, there would be no
true conflict between these laws and an OPTN policy against member transplant centers
and OPOs facilitating directed donations made in the absence of a preexisting
relationship between the deceased donor and the designated recipient.
Federal regulations and state anatomical gift statutes that permit directed donation
do not create any legal duty for transplant centers or OPOs to agree to facilitate any
particular directed donation.158 These laws specify what entities a donor may name as
the donee of an anatomical gift, but do grant either the donor or the designated recipient
the right to conscript transplant centers and OPOs into their services to effectuate the
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gift.159 A transplant center or OPO does not violate laws or regulations permitting
directed donations by refusing to facilitate any particular directed donation. Therefore,
transplant centers and OPOs would be able to comply with an OPTN policy prohibiting
facilitation of directed donation in the absence of a preexisting relationship without
violating federal or state laws that permit directed donations generally.
Under such a policy, the OPTN would be limiting the ability to direct a donation.
This limitation may be appropriate and consistent with the legislative history; permitting
directed donations to strangers was not the intention behind the UAGA directed donation
provision. The drafters of the UAGA never contemplated directed donations arranged
through solicitations and made in the absence of any preexisting relationship.160 An
OPTN policy prohibiting facilitation of deceased directed donation to strangers would
only limit the right to direct a deceased donation in a way that the right was never
intended to be exercised. Thus, it is unlikely that a court would find that such a policy
conflicts with the letter or the purpose of federal regulations and state laws that permit
directed donation.161
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e. Legislatively Restricting Directed Donations
A carefully drafted amendment to NOTA or to state anatomical gift statutes could
effectively prevent directed donations to deceased organ solicitors and withstand a
constitutional challenge. Such a restriction could be written to prohibit directed donation
to an individual with whom the deceased donor has had no preexisting relationship with
before the recipient’s need for a transplant was first identified. This would prevent
deceased directed donations to individuals with whom the donor or donor family came
into contact with solely for the purpose of facilitating a transplant, without affecting
directed donation to family members or friends.162 Such a law might be challenged on
the grounds of infringement of free speech, state/federal conflict of law principles, or
substantive due process. However, neither the free speech argument nor a conflict of
laws challenge is likely to be successful as discussed above. The substantive due process
challenge merits a close look.
Generally, courts defer to legislatures and will only invalidate a law on substantive
due process grounds if the law infringes a fundamental right.163 If a right is not
enumerated in the Constitution, the Supreme Court often will only consider it
fundamental if it is deeply rooted in the nation’s history and tradition.164 An important
factor for determining whether a right is rooted in tradition is how broadly the right can
be defined.
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The right to direct an organ donation is not deeply rooted in the history and tradition
of the nation. Traditionally at common law, courts have found that at most, one has only
a quasi-property right in one’s own tissues and only a limited right to direct burial and
disposition in the body of a deceased family member.165 Also, most courts have refused
to apply the traditional legal frameworks of property and contract law to organ
transplantation cases when there is an applicable statute that has balanced the moral and
social issues.166 Thus, the legal right to direct a donation as either a fundamental property
or contract right is not likely to be considered deeply founded in our nation’s history and
tradition. It is statutory, and was created by state legislatures following the adoption of
the UAGA in 1968.167 And, in fact, at least one state expressly prohibits directed
deceased donation.168
Of course, it may be possible characterize directed donation as a traditional right
by more broadly defining it as the right to control the disposition of one’s body materials
or remains.169 In Brotherton v. Cleaveland, the 6th Circuit and in Newman v.
Sathyavaglswaran, the 9th Circuit found a fundamental right to control the final
disposition of one’s body that extended to property interests of possession and transfer,
and which was protected by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.170
Defined this broadly, such a constitutional right would seem to prevent legislatures from
limiting one’s ability to transfer an anatomical gift to an individual of one’s choosing.
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Nevertheless, both the Brotherton and Newman cases related to a situation in which
the state interfered with the rights of the next-of-kin by statutorily authorizing coroners to
remove a deceased’s corneas without consent or even providing the next-of-kin notice.171
Thus, the more narrow reading of these holdings is simply that the state cannot violate the
next-of-kin’s property interest in a deceased’s body by taking a body part without
obtaining consent. Framed this way, the protected right seems to be a negative right to be
free from interference with possession of property, not a positive right to demand that
medical providers effectuate a transfer of property.
Although the Second Circuit in Colavito v. New York Donor Network, raises the
question of whether the designated recipient of a directed donation has a property right in
the directed organ, no court has found a fundamental legal right to transfer a body part to
a specific person of one’s choosing.172 Defining the right to control the disposition of the
body broadly enough to encompass such a right may have undesirable consequences. For
example, one would be able to argue that an organ donor has a fundamental legal right to
place racial restrictions on a donation so that only certain races or classes of people could
be recipients. State laws such as the Florida statute that prohibits donors from placing
discriminatory restrictions on potential recipients of an anatomical gift on the basis of
race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, physical handicap, health status, marital
status, or economic status might be invalid.173 A right to place such discriminatory
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restrictions on an organ donation is not traditional and has never been recognized as such
at common law or in statute.174
Congress and the states adopted NOTA and the UAGA before patients were
publicly soliciting directed donations, and legislators probably only contemplated
deceased directed donations made to family members, close friends, or others with whom
the donor had emotional ties.175 Given this and the undesirable consequences of drawing
the right more broadly, a court is likely to find that if there is a traditional legal right, it is
defined only as the right to direct a donation to a family member or friend. Thus, even if
the right to direct a deceased donation could be construed as rooted in the nation’s history
and tradition and therefore fundamental, the right to direct a donation to a stranger would
likely fall outside of this right. Therefore, a federal or state law that prohibits directed
donation in the absence of a preexisting relationship would not violate substantive due
process and would withstand a constitutional challenge.

V.

Conclusion
Lawmakers and healthcare providers should continue to permit solicitations of

directed donations from living organ donors because this practice will increase total
organ donations without depriving any potential recipients of organs they otherwise
would have received or compromising an established allocation system. In contrast,
solicitations of directed donations from deceased donors should be restricted because
such donations unjustifiably sacrifice medical utility and are inequitable in that they favor
patients with “attractiveness,” wealth, and the ability to draw media attention. Public
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solicitations threaten to undermine the national system which is carefully established to
equitably and efficiently allocate deceased organs.
An outright ban on deceased organ solicitations may not be desirable and is not
likely to withstand a constitutional challenge because charitable solicitations are
protected under the first amendment as free speech. However, intrusive organ
solicitations for a directed donation can and should be subject to reasonable regulations,
such as restrictions on the information contained in organ solicitations and the time,
place, and manner in which solicitations are made. Additionally, transplant centers
should carefully consider whether they wish to adopt a policy restricting transplants on
recipients who solicit deceased organs. Organ Procurement Organizations should also
carefully consider adoption of any policy refusing to facilitate deceased organ donations
directed in the absence of a preexisting relationship. Most importantly, the Organ
Procurement and Transplantation Network (OPTN) likely has Congressional authority to
prevent member OPOs and transplant centers from facilitating deceased directed
donations made in the absence of a preexisting relationship between the donor and the
designated recipient; and this may be the most politically expedient solution to the issue.
Finally, Congress and states have the power to enact a statutory ban on deceased directed
donations made in the absence of a preexisting relationship. Lawmakers, UNOS and its
member OPOs and Transplant Centers, as well as healthcare providers should consider
all of these options to limit donors and donor families from directing deceased organ
donations to solicitors. The integrity of the national organ allocation system as a
mechanism to maximize utility and equity of a scarce resource and the thousands of
people awaiting a fair chance at receiving life saving transplants depend on it.

